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Abstract. This paper gives a hands-on introduction to the Proxmark, a versatile tool for
RFID security research. It can be used to analyze and reverse engineer RFID protocols de-
ployed in billions of cards, tags, fobs, phones and keys. We give a heads up introduction on
how to embed new modulation and encoding schemes into the Proxmark, which helps to get
a grip on the low level RF-communication details. As example we point out several (dev-
astating) weaknesses which are made at this low levels. Most notably the MIFARE Classic
with its weakly encrypted parity bits, which enables an attacker to recover the secret key.
Furthermore, we describe the practical cryptanalysis of several proprietary RFID protocols
and ciphers. In this part we introduce the Proxmark as an effective attack tool that can
perform practical attacks a hundred times faster than regular RFID readers.
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1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the most pervasive technologies nowadays. It
was first introduced for identification purposes only, but quickly expanded to other applications
like transport ticketing systems and access control. The security and privacy of these systems
is often overlooked. This is, to a good extend, due to the fact that it is hard to know what
are the underlying security mechanisms employed. A surprisingly large number of access control
systems use the tag’s unique identifier (UID) as their only security mechanism. Moreover, large
scale ticketing systems use simple memory cards [17, 46, 52, 55] for fare collection. This type of
cards lack any cryptographic capabilities and therefore the security of these systems relies on UID
blacklisting mechanisms. When portable tag-emulating devices are available [11, 18, 39, 42, 57, 58],
these security mechanisms become obsolete.
Many RFID tags and contactless smart cards use proprietary security mechanisms for authen-
tication and confidentiality. Since these tags are widely deployed in access control and ticketing
systems, it is important to independently assess their security. This paper explains how the Prox-
mark device can be used for RFID protocol analysis and to exploit implementation attacks. It
facilitate message eavesdropping and emulation of both tags and readers. We analyse various com-
munication protocols that operate at a low frequency (125kHz) and high frequency (13.56MHz).
The Proxmark supports all major modulation and encoding schemes. Therefore, it is able to com-
municate with many different proprietary communication protocols used by various RFID tags.
These tools are fully programable and allow for quick prototyping, testing and debugging of new
RFID protocols, like proposed in [1,13,19,21,25,56]. All the software, firmware and hardware that
is described in this paper is open source and open design.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with some background information about
the Proxmark device. Section 3 addresses the motivation why RFID protocol research is useful
and necessary. Next, the hardware and basic components of the Proxmark device are introduced
in Section 4. Finally, we select in Section refsec:usecases two interesting use-cases and show how
to analyse and attack widely deployed RFID products.
2 Background
The Proxmark III has been developed by Jonathan Westhues. The Proxmark III, shown in Fig-
ure 2.1, replaces its predecessors and introduces a high level of flexibility in both signal processing
and protocol implementation. It is additionally equipped with a Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) which is mainly responsible for the low-level signal processing and allows to set up mul-
tiple signal processing schemes. In general, when we speak about the Proxmark, we refer to this
latest version.
Fig. 2.1. The Proxmark III
The hardware design and firmware of this latest version is in the public domain since May
2007 under the General Public License. The device costs around e200 and since the schematics
are online, it can be ordered through any local printed circuit board (PCB) supplier. Although,
most assembled Proxmark devices are sold by one of the main suppliers: Rysc Corp.1, GeZhi
Electronic Corp. Ltd.2 and hackable-devices3. The following websites contain all the information
that is required to assemble, compile, flash, use and develop new features for the Proxmark.
• http://cq.cx/proxmark3.pl The first website about the Proxmark device, created by Jonathan
Westhues in 2007. Jonathan made the project free to use and published all the necessary
designs and source codes. Five years later, already more than a thousand Proxmarks were sold
for extensive RFID protocol and security research.
• http://www.proxmark.org Contains a lot of information about new RFID modulation, encoding
and protocols that were added the last years. This website hosts the main community forum,
which is currently used by more than 3000 members. This forum answers all frequently asked
questions concerning the Proxmark, but also contains various topics about microcontroller and
FPGA development.
• http://proxmark3.googlecode.com This is the development website which hosts the most recent
subversion (SVN) repository. Only in 2012 there are already 26 active committers, who reg-
ularly fix problems and contribute new features to the Proxmark firmware. The website also
hosts a small wiki that contains a manual for using the Proxmark device. Most features and
commands are explained in detail, backed up by several output examples and pictures.
1 http://www.proxmark3.com
2 http://www.xfpga.com
3 http://www.hackable-devices.org
2
Throughout this paper we focus on contactless smart cards. For contact based smart cards
there are comparable tools available in the literature [8,12] which allows eavesdropping, emulation,
man-in-the-middle attacks and fast querying by using a dedicated FPGA.
3 Motivation
Manufacturers often claim that their tags provide ‘state-of-the-art’, ‘field-proven’ or ‘unbreakable’
security, but it is hard to know what this means and how much security you actually get. The
widely used RFID communication standards like [33–37] define the low-level transmission layers.
However, these standards do not include any details of the secure communication layer. Semi-
conductor companies are inclined to create ad-hoc RFID designs that use proprietary protocols
and cryptographic algorithms [2, 16, 31, 32, 44, 47–49,51, 54]. Such designs are often kept secret to
provide security-through-obscurity. It has been shown many times that without feedback from the
scientific community, it is hard to build secure algorithms [38, 41]. There are numerous examples
in the literature [3–7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 20, 22–24, 26–30, 40, 43, 45, 50, 53, 59–62] showing that once the
secrecy of an algorithm is lost, so is its security. As long as RFID tags do not comply with open
and community-reviewed encryption standards, the security of these tags need to be independently
assessed. In order to perform these assessments, we need tools to analyze the underlying security
protocols. While designing new RFID products and protocols, it is also useful to have a set of
tools at hand for easy protocol prototyping, testing and debugging. There are several reasons for
this kind of “analytic” research:
1. Public scrutiny. Unlike other fields, it is not really possible to prove the security of a secure
design/product. The way in which security research progresses is by proposing new construc-
tions and then exposing them to the community for critical scrutiny.
2. Informing consumers. Manufacturers often boost “unbreakable security” of their products
(while they often can be hacked within a few seconds). These claims lead consumers (as non-
security experts) to use such products in very critical/security sensitive applications.
3. Higher standards. The industry is reluctant to improve their products, even when they are
informed of their weaknesses. Only when customers demand better products industry is willing
to improve.
4. Responsible disclosure. When weaknesses are found, it is important to inform the manu-
facturer ahead of disclosure such that they can take the necessary measures. Without scientific
scrutiny, weaknesses are often found too late, when fraud/missuse has already taken place.
As long as RFID tags do not comply with open and community-reviewed encryption standards,
the security of these tags need to be independently assessed. In order to perform these assessments,
we need a powerful and flexibel tool to analyse the underlying security protocols. The Proxmark
device is such a tool. It gives direct access to the real-time data and timing information which is
very useful during protocol analysis. Furthermore, it allows the user to create a dedicated firmware
that can quickly query and repeat a modulation and encoding scheme. This particular function
can be used to perform practical attacks a hundred times faster than regular RFID readers.
4 Proxmark
4.1 Hardware
The Proxmark III supports both low (125 kHz-134kHz) and high frequency (13.56MHz) signal
processing. This is achieved by two parallel antenna circuits that can be used independently. Both
circuits are connected to a 4-pin Hirose connector to connect an external loop antenna. When the
Proxmark is in reader mode it drives the antenna coils with the appropriate frequency. This is
unnecessary when the Proxmark works in eavesdropping mode or in card emulation mode because
then the electromagnetic field is generated by the reader. The signal from the antenna is routed
through the FPGA after it has been digitized by an 8-bit Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC).
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After some filtering, the FPGA relays the necessary information to perform the decoding of the
signal to the microcontroller. This prevents the microcontroller from being overloaded with signal
data. An FPGA has a great advantage over a normal microcontroller in the sense that it emulates
hardware. A hardware description can be compiled and flashed into an FPGA. Basic arithmetic
operations can be performed in parallel and faster than in a microcontroller. An FPGA is of course
slower than a hardware implementation but pure hardware lacks flexibility.
The microcontroller is responsible for the protocol part. It receives the digital signal from the
FPGA and decodes it. The decoded signal can just be copied to a buffer in the EEPROM memory.
Additionally, an answer to an incoming message can be programmed to be sent immediately,
communicating this to the FPGA which then modulates the appropriate signal.
The Proxmark has a USB interface to the computer. The current implementation uses the
default Human Interface Device (HID) USB protocol. Flashing of the microcontroller and the
FPGA can be done via USB. Only the first time the JTAG interface is used to set up a bootloader
on the microcontroller. The hardware design that can be flashed into the FPGA is written in
Verilog. Verilog is a hardware description language which allows to describe a hardware design in
a C-style syntax.
4.2 Software
The Proxmark can operate in three different mores: sniffing mode; card emulation mode; and reader
mode. It is possible to use the Proxmark for very different modulation schemes and protocols as
long as there are in the supported frequency range. Some well known protocols and modulation
schemes are already available. There are some requirements to implement the mentioned modes
for new protocols. First, we need an underlying physical layer which takes care of the Digital
Signal Processing (DSP). Next, the modes of operation should be implemented as functions on
the microcontroller. Finally, the client should be able to call these functions and display the results.
The processing and generation of the protocol messages is partly done by the FPGA and partly
by the microcontroller. The FPGA deals with signal processing issues like edge detection and then
communicates the result to the microcontroller. The microcontroller then tries to decode the bit
stream depending on the modulation scheme. In order to generate a signal the microcontroller
will send a bit stream to the FPGA. This stream is encoded using the corresponding modulation
scheme, e.g., Manchester or Modified Miller. The FPGA modulates according to this bit stream.
The decision to split the DSP in two parts is mainly because of the limited capacity of the FPGA.
It cannot do signal processing and message decoding/encoding at the same time.
The microcontroller implements the transport layer. First it decodes the samples received
from the FPGA. These samples are stored in a Direct Memory Access (DMA) buffer. The samples
are binary sequences that represent whether the signal was high or low. The software on the
microcontroller tries to decode these samples. When the Proxmark is in sniffing mode this is done
for both the reader and tag signal at the same time. Whenever one of the decoding procedures
returns a valid message, this message is stored in another buffer (BigBuf). The BigBuf is especially
useful for protocol analysis. Every single message is stored in this buffer. When a card is emulated
or when the Proxmark is used as a reader the BigBuf can be used to store status messages or
protocol exceptions.
The client application works as a console application and connects to the Proxmark via the
standard HID USB protocol. The microcontroller continuously polls for new USB packets. Cur-
rently it is not possible to stream the retrieved samples directly to the PC in real-time. When
the microcontroller retrieves a command from the client, it runs this command and stores any
resulting messages in its memory buffer. Next, the client sends a second command to retrieve the
data from this buffer.
5 Use-cases
This section shows how to use the Proxmark in practice, by using it for two concrete use-cases.
The first use-case exploits one of the many vulnerability that were found in the MIFARE Classic
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tag. It shows how to recover the secret key from a building access control reader, by using only
one eavesdropped authentication trace. In the second use-case is shown how to recover the secret
master key from a iClass Elite access control reader using the Proxmark as a tag emulator.
5.1 MIFARE Classic
Enter the following command to start eavesdropping ISO/IEC 14443 type A communication:
hf 14a snoop
Hold the Proxmark antenna next to the reader and present the MIFARE Classic tag. Blink-
ing of the lights indicate transmission was captured. Press the button on the Proxmark to stop
the gathering frames or wait until the buffer is full. The trace most likely contains more than
only the authentication information. Before the reader can exchange messages with a MIFARE
Classic tag, it needs to perform the anti-collision protocol, see [36]. Most of these messages can be
ignores, except second message from the tag, which reveals the unique identifier (UID) of the tag.
To retrieve the eavesdropped trace from the Proxmark, the following command can be used:
hf 14a list
If the trace is received correctly, it looks very similar to the example trace which is shown below.
If the trace partial frames, unexpected messages, not a clear message toggling between reader
and tag, then the reception was not good enough. Try a different angle, more/less space between
reader-antenna-tag, various speed to present the tag. If the antenna is tuned enough, it should
pick up the signal and produce a similar trace to the one below.
+ 50782: : 26
+ 33822: : 26
+ 50422: : 26
+ 64: 0: TAG 04 00
+ 944: : 93 20
+ 64: 0: TAG 9c 59 9b 32 6c
+ 1839: : 93 70 9c 59 9b 32 6c 6b 30
+ 64: 0: TAG 08 b6 dd
+ 3783: : 60 32 64 69
+ 113: 0: TAG 82 a4 16 6c
+ 1287: : a1 e4 58 ce 6e ea 41 e0
+ 64: 0: TAG 5c ad f4 39
With this information it is possible to execute the mfkey4 tool accordingly:
./mfkey <uid> <nt> <{nr}> <{ar}> <{at}>
./mfkey 9c599b32 82a4166c a1e458ce 6eea41e0 5cadf439
Which results for this example in the following output:
MIFARE Classic key recovery
Recovering key for:
uid: 9c599b32
nt: 82a4166c
{nr}: a1e458ce
{ar}: 6eea41e0
{at}: 5cadf439
4 http://proxmark3.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/tools/mfkey
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LFSR succesors of the tag challenge:
nt’: 8d65734b
nt’’: 9a427b20
Keystream used to generate {ar} and {at}:
ks2: e38f32ab
ks3: c6ef8f19
Found Key: [ff ff ff ff ff ff]
5.2 iClass
Enter the following command to start emulating the card serial number (CSN) of an iClass Elite
card. hf iclass sim 0 031FEC8AF7FF12E0
After presenting the Proxmark to an iClass Elite reader, it tries to authenticate the (emulated)
card with random challenges. The Proxmark captures the authentication attempts which are used
to recover the secret master key. The output that is generated by the Proxmark is shown as follows:
--simtype:00 csn:03 1f ec 8a f7 ff 12 e0
#db# READER AUTH (len=09): 05 00 00 00 00 bf 5d 67 7f
At least one authentication attempts for the following list is required:
Card Serial Number (CSN)| recovers matrix byte index
00 0B 0F FF F7 FF 12 E0 | 00 01
00 04 0E 08 F7 FF 12 E0 | 02
00 09 0D 05 F7 FF 12 E0 | 03
00 0A 0C 06 F7 FF 12 E0 | 04
00 0F 0B 03 F7 FF 12 E0 | 05
00 08 0A 0C F7 FF 12 E0 | 06
00 0D 09 09 F7 FF 12 E0 | 07
00 0E 08 0A F7 FF 12 E0 | 08
00 03 07 17 F7 FF 12 E0 | 09
00 3C 06 E0 F7 FF 12 E0 | 10
00 01 05 1D F7 FF 12 E0 | 11
00 02 04 1E F7 FF 12 E0 | 12
00 07 03 1B F7 FF 12 E0 | 13
00 00 02 24 F7 FF 12 E0 | 14
00 05 01 21 F7 FF 12 E0 | 15
These bytes reveal the first line of the matrix that is constructed by using the master key and
some weak combination of encrypting itself. With this information it is possible to brute force the
key with a total complexity of only 225 DES encryptions.
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